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ABSTRACT
On 1 January 1993 the European Union (EU) formed the world’s
largest single unified market consisting of some 350 million
consumers. Since this time additional Western European
countries have become members of the EU, with the prospects of
expanded membership to include other wealthy Western
European nations. However, this paper attempts to analyse the
prospects of expanded EU membership from the ranks of the
former Eastern bloc states, which have, since the late 1980s and
early 1990s, been attempting to transform their economies from
the communist era of central planning to that of market
economies.
The likelihood of such membership from the former Comecon
group of nations in the foreseeable future, is most realistically
limited to those from Central Europe—Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. All of these have already applied
for such membership. In the process of striving for EU
membership, which is regarded by each nation as being both
economically and politically desirable, instead of having adopted
a group, or cooperative, approach, each have adopted an
individualistic approach involving a reorientation of their trade
away from each other to the EU and active competition for hard
currency exports and for foreign direct investment.
The paper is primarily concerned with identifying the recent
macroeconomic performance of three of these Central European
economies—Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland identifying
some of the major reform measures which have been
implemented as well as some of the major difficulties which each
of them is currently experiencing. The major issues and
stumbling blocks which exist to their membership of the EU are
also discussed.

INTRODUCTION
In a recent best seller written by Lester Thurow,1he predicted that
the economic battle of the twenty first century between the three
economic superpowers — Japan, USA and Europe — would be
won by Europe with Germany at its hub. However, such a
prediction was based upon the premise that Europe — both
West, Central and East would be able to unite to form a single
unified market, incorporating Russia, consisting of some 800
million consumers. On 1 January, within the confines of Western
Europe, the European Union took a major step in this direction by
foixning the world's largest single unified market consisting of
some 350 million consumers. Since this time additional countries
have become members of the EU (as of 1 January 1995 — Austria,
Finland and Sweden), with the prospects of expanded
membership to include Switzerland and perhaps Norway in the
reasonably near future and Turkey somewhat further down the
track. However, of some interest is the prospect that EU
membership will be expanded from the ranks of the former
Eastern bloc states, which, since the late 1980s and early 1990s,
are transforming their economies from being centrally planned to
market driven.
The likelihood of such membership in the foreseeable future
from the former Comecon2 group of nations, is most realistically
limited to five of these from Central Europe — Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The remaining nations
of Central and Eastern Europe are experiencing major economic
dislocations in their transition processes, or from the ravages of

1 L. Thurow (1992), Head to Head, Allen & Unwin.
2 Of course the reunification of West and East Germany in 1990 resulted in the
former Comecon country of East Germany now having become incorporated
in the EU.
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war, and are in much too weak an economic position to be
realistically considered for membership in the foreseeable future.
In 1991 four of these Central European economies met in
Visegrad, Hungary, after the demise of the Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA) in January of that year, to identify
what their options were for the future. However the "Visegrad
group" as they became known, and the resulting Central
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), has become largely
irrelevant, with members instead reorientating their trade away
from each other and actively competing3 for hard currency
exports to the EU and for foreign direct investment. Such an
individualistic, rather than cooperative, approach by these
nations may also be a reflection of their belief that in doing so
their individual prospects for joining the EU is likely to be
enhanced.
All of these Central European nations have applied for
membership of the EU, and an important issue arises as to the
timing of such membership. Their are diverging viewpoints over
this. The Hungarian position is that membership of the EU should
be based on merit and should not be on a group basis, whilst the
Poles take the position that the group should take a more
cooperative stance and join the EU at the same time. Although in
the latter case the reality is very different.
The remainder of this paper considers some of the major
reform measures which have been conducted in the Central
European economies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland
in particular, as well as some of the major difficulties which each
of them is currently experiencing in their transition process. Their
recent macroeconomic performance during this transition to a
market economy is also considered. In addition, some of the
3 Or in the case of the former countries of the Czech and Slovak Republic
(CSFR), the Czech Republic and Slovakia, actively squabbling with each
other after their agreed separation on 1 January 1993.
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major issues and stumbling blocks which exist to their
membership of the EU are also discussed. Finally a summary of
the major conclusions from this paper is presented.
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN THE THREE ECONOMIES
This section focuses upon the major reform measures which have
been implemented in the three countries under review, in the
process of transforming from centrally planned to market
economies during the 1990s. The situation for each country is now
discussed in turn.
Czech Republic
During its transition process to date, there have been two major
areas towards which economic reform has been directed:
i. Monetary policy and financial sector reform
ii. Fiscal policy and reforms
i. M onetary policy and fin an cial sector reform

Since the introduction of reforms in early 1991, monetary policy
has played a key role in the financial stabilisation of the economy.
Its successful implementation is reflected in the reduction of
inflation, the stability of the nominal exchange rate and the
strengthening of the external reserves position. However its
implementation has been difficult due to the short period of time
since the introduction of the reforms, and the change in underlying
behavioural relationships which have made the formulation of an
appropriate policy stance even more difficult. The economy's
fixed exchange rate regime, strong capital inflows, which have
been the sole source of increase in reserve money since mid 1993,
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have additionally exerted pressure on the central bank in the
conduct of monetary policy.
However Czech policy makers have made considerable
progress in developing indirect instruments of monetary control.
With the removal of direct ceilings on commercial bank credits by
October 1992, the primary focus of monetary control shifted to
auctions of refinance credit and adjustments in minimum reserve
requirements. Since mid 1993, the use of refinance credit auctions
has been minimal and, with growing capital inflows, open market
operations have become increasingly important. From 1994 the
system of monetary management has been based on open market
operations, changes in reserve requirements and adjustments of
the discount rate.
The establishment of a sound commercial banking sector was
emphasised in the transition program of the former Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR) during 1991-92, and later in the
newly formed Czech Republic. Such efforts have included the
introduction of a more effective banking regulation and
supervisory regime, the establishment of an efficient payments
system and strengthening the balance sheets of the commercial
banks through a combination of both centralised and
decentralised approaches. The centralised operations were aimed
at non performing loans inherited from the days of central
planning or incurred on behalf of the state. The measures have
included transfers of debt out of individual banks, exchanging
poor quality debt for official assets and providing capital
infusion. The decentralised approach requires banks to bear major
responsibility in accumulating loan-loss provisions and building
up their capital base. To facilitate this task the government has
given limited tax incentives for loan-loss provisions and issued
risk classification guidelines and regulations covering credit
exposures and capital adequacy. To minimise the moral hazard
issues associated with the balance sheet restructuring operations
4

and to strengthen corporate governance of banks, all the large
formerly state owned banks, with the exception of the foreign
trade banks, were privatised in the first wave of voucher
privatisation.
To foster competition, a liberal approach was taken to the
entry of new private banks. Forty seven new banks have emerged
since the beginning of the reform process, about one-half with
partial or full participation.
ii. Fiscal policy and reforms

The objective of fiscal policy has been twofold: to reduce the role
of the state in the economy, and secondly to assist in the
stabilisation of the economy. With the first objective in mind, the
government has implemented the following measures:
•

cut subsidies in 1991 and kept the level unchanged in
nominal terms thereafter,

•

reformed corporate income taxation. In 1991, the rates
of tax on profits were reduced by 10-20 percentage
points and the rate structure was simplified. In 1993 a
single 45% profits tax replaced three earlier business
taxes. The rate was lowered to 42% in 1994,

•

introduced further tax reform in 1993, including the
introduction of a Value Added Tax (VAT) (at rates of
zero, 5 and 23 %) and reform of the income tax (both
personal and corporate) and social security systems. A
personal income tax on a progressive scale was
introduced to replace the previous patchwork of taxes
on the wages of large enterprises and various other
forms of income. For social security, the old payroll tax
of differential rates was replaced by a system where
both the employer and the employee contributed. The
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effect of the tax reforms of 1993 was to shift the tax
burden from corporate incomes onto wage incomes.
On the expenditure side, a number of social safety net
programs were introduced in 1990. These included unemployment
insurance, support for families in poverty and the long term
unemployed, and cash payments to households as compensation
for price liberalisation. In 1994 aid programs for low income
tenants and matching subsidies of voluntary, supplemental
pension contributions in private plans were introduced. Outwith
these changes the entitlement system, especially pensions and
family allowances, continued to be as before under central
planning.
From 1994 the government formulated its budget within the
framework of a medium term strategy to achieve the following
objectives: reduce the expenditure to GDP ratio gradually to 4042 % by the year 2000, reduce the tax burden to levels prevailing
in industrial countries, and stabilise the nominal level of public
debt. To achieve the latter, a balanced budget every year was the
objective.
The Czech transformation has now entered a new stage. The
major tasks in this new stage are to consolidate the gains of
stabilisation, and to focus upon the restructuring of enterprises.
The recent recovery of output and strong export performance (as
discussed in the following section) as well as strong capital
inflows in the form of enterprise borrowing abroad, suggest that
some parts of the industrial sector are making the necessary
structural adjustments. However increasing non performing loans
in the portfolio of domestic banks suggests that others are
continuing to struggle through the transformation process.
It is unlikely that the desired transformation of the economy
can be achieved without substantial enterprise closures. Rigidities
and distortions that are still built into the economy will also need
6

to be eliminated. Unless measures are urgently taken to improve
labour mobility from areas of surplus labour to places where new
jobs are being created, not only is it likely that regional
unemployment from firm closures will be high but economic
growth will be stifled. A chronic shortage of housing currently
constrains such labour mobility.
Hungary
With the end of the socialist era in 1990, Hungary faced many
economic and social challenges. Beginning with the New Economic
Mechanism in 1968, efforts had been made to adapt the system
of central planning to increase its responsiveness to the needs of
producers and consumers. However major changes were still
required in order to enable the economy to operate in such a way
as to be consistent with that of a market economy by 1990,
including changes in enterprise structure and governance and in
labour and capital markets. Although there had been previous
reforms in the areas of trade and price liberalisation, and those
relating to the budget, tax policy, and the banking system, they
needed to be further extended and refined.
The newly elected incoming government devised a broad based
four year plan for structural and macroeconomic reforms during
its first year in office. The so called Kupa program, named after
the Minister of Finance, spelled out a detailed plan specifying the
problems to be addressed, the intended goals, the necessary tasks
of the government, the forms of remedy (laws, regulations,
creation of new institutions), their scheduled dates of enactment
or creation and the relevant government institutions responsible.
Success with structural reforms has been uneven however.
Whilst considerable progress with respect to price and trade
liberalisation has been achieved, enabling the Hungarian economy
to achieve a relatively liberal system, progress has proven more
7

difficult in many areas of fiscal reform, as well as enterprise and
banking restructuring. The state still plays a major role within the
economy, including its redistributive function which has
contributed to high marginal tax rates. This has hampered
economic activity, and contributed to adverse macroeconomic
developments in the budget deficit, current account deficit and
the uncomfortably high foreign debt.
The major areas of economic reform have been as follows:
Price liberalisation

The price system had been liberalised in stages since the
introduction of reforms under the New Economic Mechanism. By
1989, only 17% of consumer prices remained officially determined
with the remainder freely determined. The share of free consumer
prices was increased to 89% in 1991, 92% in 1992 and 94% in
1993. Government determined prices remained only for electric
energy, public transport and pharmaceuticals. In 1991, the Price
Office, which was responsible for controlling prices, was
eliminated.
Trade liberalisation

The new government was the leading international advocate of
dismantling the CMEA trading system. This dismantling occurred
in 1991, and thereafter almost all transactions were conducted at
world prices and in convertible currencies. The objective of the
new government was instead to focus the country's trade policy
with that of EU members, and in early 1992 an Association
Agreement was adopted with the EU outlining a timetable for the
dismantling of trade barriers. In addition the Central European
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) comprising Hungary itself,
Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics and subsequently

Slovenia, was adopted, including a timetable for a free trade area
among the partner countries. At the beginning of 1995, further
trade liberalisation was implemented under agreements with the
EU, CEFTA and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) as
well as under the Uruquay Round. By as early as 1990, about
90% of total imports were already free of quantitative or value
limitations
Fiscal reforms

The fiscal reform program included an ambitious strategy to
modify the budgetary sector to make it consistent with a market
economy. This included further reforming the tax system, reducing
the scope and scale of fiscal activities and increasing the
efficiency of remaining activities. While partial, but significant,
progress was made in regard to achieving the first objective, the
other two objectives were essentially not achieved.
In regard to tax reforms the government's intention was to
broaden the direct tax bases by reducing and eliminating large
numbers of tax reliefs and exemptions granted under enterprise
profit and personal income taxation. In addition, it intended to
introduce realistic depreciation rates and to eliminate the zero
bracket in the value added tax (VAT). However measures to
broaden personal income tax and social security contributions
were not adopted. In addition VAT reforms were delayed until
fiscal pressures dominated in January 1993.
As to the intended goal of reducing the scope and scale of
government activities, the authorities were even less ambitious
and successful in comparison with their stated objectives. The
share of general government expenditure was estimated at around
60% of GDP in 1993/94, a higher share than at the beginning of
the reform process in 1990 and also considerably higher than in
most of the other transition economies in Central Europe.
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Monetary policy and banking reforms
Steady progress was made by the National Bank of Hungary
(NBH) in introducing, and increasingly relying on, indirect
instruments to effect monetary policy, and the practice of
providing automatic refinancing credits was gradually replaced
with a system of auctions. In addition the cost of such credits
was progressively increased, to induce banks to compete for
deposits. Ceilings on household deposit rates were eliminated in
1992. An interbank market, created in 1990, played an increasing
role in supplying banks with marginal short term funding. The
NBH also streamlined, reduced, and began paying interest on
banks' mandatory reserves.
Parliament passed in December 1991 laws relating to both
central and commercial banking, with one of the more important
features of the first being an explicit statement concerning the
NBH's legal independence; its primary responsibility for ensuring
the value of the currency; and a stricter limit on the amount of
direct financing of the state budget deficit to be phased in over a
number of years.
It was also recognised by the government that higher priority
needed to be given to improving both the financial integrity of the
banking system, and to altering incentives such that banks would
be willing to reduce operating spreads and resume lending to
creditworthy customers.
In regard to capital market reforms the Budapest Stock Market
was reopened after 40 years in 1990, making Hungary the first
European transition economy to take such a step. A large number
of supportive acts (such as the Act on Compensation,
Accounting, Investment Funds and Employee Stock Ownership
Plans) were implemented for the development of private capital
markets. An interbank market for foreign exchange was created in
1992, and a futures market for these assets was created the
following year. Also an act in 1993 established a bank financed
10

deposit insurance fund, and the adoption in 1994 of a law
allowing for the creation of private pension schemes further
strengthened and began to broaden capital markets in Hungary.
Enterprise governance and structure

The government, determined to accelerate the transformation of
state enterprise behaviour so as to be consistent with that of a
market economy, hardened budget constraints, instituted a broad
based privatisation plan, and further increased the autonomy
granted to enterprise decision making from earlier periods. The
government's privatisation plan combined a quick privatisation of
some 10,000 small service establishments and, following the
negative reaction to "spontaneous" privatisation, a case by case
decision process concerning larger enterprises. In 1990 the
government created the State Property Agency to privatise
enterprises within its portfolio. The State Asset Management
Company was formed in 1992, and was given control over 150
enterprises in which the government intended to retain a 100 per
cent, a majority or a significant minority interest.
Despite the growth of the private sector, which soon
accounted for the majority of activity, problems still existed with
a number of significant large loss making state owned enterprises.
The tightening of budget constraints, combined with the sharp fall
in external demand and change in production and trade patterns,
exposed a large number of state owned enterprises as being
fundamentally unsound. While most small and medium sized
enterprises were forced to confront their situation through
downsizing, bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings, a number of
large enterprises, employing significant shares of the labour force,
were able to continue operating while accumulating large losses.
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Labour market reforms
A number of significant reforms have taken place regarding labour
issues in recent years. A system of centralised bargaining has been
created, and institutions facilitating labour market mobility have
emerged. However the labour market remains extremely inflexible,
with little mobility between employment and unemployment, and
within employment. In addition real wages have remained fairly
rigid, especially when non wage compensation is taken into
account.
To promote labour mobility and provide a social safety net, a
number of institutions were created in the early 1990s. For
example the Solidarity Fund was created in 1991 to provide
unemployment compensation, and in 1992 a social assistance law
was adopted which provided cash benefits and specific services
to those who had either exhausted or were not eligible for
unemployment compensation.
Poland
The economic situation in Poland deteriorated in the late 1980s,
becoming particularly acute in 1989 with the emergence of
hyperinflation and a large fiscal deficit. In the preceding years
there had been several attempts to reform the economic system, to
redress the inadequacies of Poland's centrally planned regime.
However their limited nature appears, if anything, to have
exacerbated the difficulties that were being experienced. It became
increasingly clear that a more fundamental break in the economic
regime was required, and in 1990 Poland embarked on a program
of reform with a view to stabilising the economy and putting it on
a transition path to a market economy. The Polish reform
approach provides an excellent example of a shock therapy or
"big bang" approach, indicative of an immediate change from a
centralised to a market economy. In successive steps the new
12

Polish government conducted the following reform measures from
January 1990:
i. freed most prices from central control and eliminated most
subsidies. Prices were allowed to increase with the objective
of increasing supply, by providing an incentive for farmers
and factories to produce more,
ii. the central government set itself the objective of balancing
its budget to eliminate deficit spending, which had been a
major contributor to the rapid increase in inflation in the
economy in 1988 and 1989,
iii. in January 1990 the official and black market exchange rates
were unified, and the exchange rate was devalued by some
31.6% and fixed against the US dollar (9,500 zloty per US
dollar). The devaluation, it was hoped, would encourage
foreign investment and make domestic products competitive
in world markets. In May 1991 the currency was further
devalued (by 16.8% against the dollar and 14.4% against a
basket of currencies) and the exchange rate was now pegged
to a basket of currencies and not just the dollar. This
reflected the increasing importance of Western European
markets for domestically produced products. From October
1991 the zloty was allowed to devalue on the basis of a
preannounced crawl, and has steadily fallen in value ever
since; and
iv. state enterprises were privatised. The Ministry of
Ownership Change was created to oversee the process, and
specialised institutions were set up to facilitate it. The State
Enterprise Privatisation Law was adopted in July 1990,
permitting four separate approaches to the privatisation of
state properties:
•

sales of entire firms to Polish or foreign investors,

•

liquidation of firm assets and their sales to private
investors,
13

•

free distribution of shares to investors,

•

establishment of holding companies.

A number of problems regarding privatisation have become
apparent, not the least of which has been in regard to the sale of
large scale and obsolete state industrial enterprises. There was no
idea as to the real value of such factories, hence there was no way
of determining their fair market value. Additional problems lay in
poor infrastructure such as for financial institutions, with the
country only in the very elementary process of creating a
commercial banking system and in the setting up of a stock
exchange in Warsaw. The problem of unemployment necessitated,
in practice, increased government support for large employers,
such as the steel industry. In addition, state managers through
corruption, ineptitude, or both, either sold or absconded with
enterprise assets.
Privatisation, however, has had successes. Small scale retail
and wholesale outlets were quickly privatised, and more than 1.2
million new private companies were created in the 16 months
after privatisation
occurred. Privatisation has worked
particularly well in the service sector, with banks and most
department stores having been privatised. However the industrial
base of the economy remains weak, and prospects for its recovery
remain poor because of the difficulty of making such Polish
industries as steel and shipbuilding competitive in world markets.
However the slow progress in the privatisation of medium and
large scale industrial enterprises has led to the adoption of an
alternative approach. The government intends privatising such
enterprises through a Mass Privatisation Program (MPP). The
MPP is to be a voucher based privatisation scheme, in which as
many as 600 state owned enterprises can choose to participate.
The vouchers to be distributed could be used to purchase shares
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in investment funds, which would be freely traded on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange. The MPP was implemented in 1995.
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DURING THE TRANSITION
PROCESS
This section identifies macroeconomic developments since 1989 in
the three transition economies focused upon in this paper. A brief
review of these for each economy in turn is now conducted.
The Czech Republic
Among the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, it
is generally regarded that the Czech Republic has been the most
successful, to the present, in moving to a market oriented
economy. Macroeconomic developments strongly support this,
and particularly in regard to the attainment of financial stability.
Inflation has been significantly reduced (Table 3) and the balance
of payments surpluses have made it possible for the country to
accumulate substantial foreign exchange reserves (Table 9). This
has reduced its reliance on balance of payments assistance and
enabled it to repay early its entire debt to the International
Monetary Fund.
The Czech Republic stands out from the other transition
economies in a number of respects. Firstly, its unemployment rate
has remained low and indeed below that of most countries in the
EU (Table 4). Secondly fiscal difficulties arising from the
transition process have been contained, with the government
achieving a budget surplus in both 1993 and 1994 (Table 6).
Thirdly, with the completion of the second wave of privatisation,
some 80% of the assets in the economy are in private hands.
Fourthly the credit rating of the country in international capital
markets has continually improved, and is much higher than that
15

of any other transition economy. Finally, and by no means least,
the authorities have been very successful in maintaining support
for the reforms from the population, primarily due to the
popularity of the President Vaclav Havel and respect for the
Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus.
These achievements are even more noteworthy due to the
particular difficulties faced by the country both at the outset and
during the transition process. At the outset the country, whilst it
was part of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), was
in a much weaker position than the other former centrally planned
economies. Firstly the state dominated production, the market
mechanism was virtually absent and trade was heavily oriented
towards members of the former Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) (Table 1). In addition as the reform program
was being launched the external environment deteriorated
sharply, as trade with CMEA members shifted to world prices
and convertible currencies, and economic adjustments or crises in
other CMEA countries significantly reduced the CSFR's
traditional export markets.
The former CSFR achieved early success in overcoming the
cumulative effects of large scale liberalisation and a severe terms
of trade shock associated with the dismantling of the CMEA
trade and payments arrangements. However the CSFR did start
with favourable macroeconomic conditions — low inflation,
limited monetary overhang and a small external debt burden (as a
per cent of GDP) (see Table 8 specifically for the case of the Czech
Republic) — all of which contributed to this early success. But
more importantly was the vigorous pursuit of stabilisation
policies comprising a pegged exchange rate and restrictive fiscal,
monetary and incomes policies.
The reform program itself was of the "big bang" type and
included a number of structural measures, including: the
liberalisation of prices and the exchange rate and trade systems;
16

preparation for a rapid privatisation program; and a mutually
reinforcing package of financial reforms. In the months preceding
the introduction of the reform measures the external value of the
koruna had been cut by nearly one half through several rounds of
devaluation. Czech officials believed that for the sake of
macroeconomic stability, and to limit the costs of the
transformation, it was desirable to create two initial conditions —
a depreciated exchange rate and a cut in real wages, both with the
objective of maintaining international competitiveness.
The early progress in domestic and external stabilisation was
threatened in the second half of 1992 and early 1993, due to
uncertainties arising from the dissolution of the CSFR on 1
January 1993 and the early termination of the Czech and Slovak
monetary union in February 1993. However such difficulties were
overcome by the new Czech Republic government's commitment
to strong stabilisation policies.
Major success has been achieved by the Czech Republic in four
key areas:
i.

unemployment and output recovery,

ii.

rebuilding the external sector,

iii.

inflation reduction,

iv.

privatisation and restructuring.

Unemployment and output recovery
A combination of reforms and external shocks contributed to a
sharp decline in economic activity in the CSFR (see Table 2
specifically for the Czech Republic), mainly focused in 1991 but
also occurring in 1992. Economic recovery occurred in the second
half of 1992, but was undermined by uncertainties relating to the
dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Republic and a considerable
deterioration in Czech-Slovak trade. After suffering a cumulative
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decline of about 20 per cent during 1991-93, real GDP increased
by 2.6% in 1994. The Czech Republic's decline in activity was
marginally higher than that of Poland's, to some extent reflecting
its previously higher dependency on CMEA markets (Table 1)
and the extra year it took to recover due to the dissolution of the
Czech and Slovak federation. Developments in the output trend
is largely dominated by industry, which accounts for some 35% of
GDP. All branches of industry experienced a sizeable decline in
1991 arising from economy wide factors, but during 1992-93 the
impact was variable across sectors indicative of specific sector
factors. In late 1993 the decline in output in industry bottomed
out, recovering slowly in 1994 (Table 5).
Whilst the initial decline in output was very pronounced the
decline in employment was much less so. During the period 199193, the cumulative fall in employment was only 9%. The
development of small scale activity in industry and construction
and rapid growth in trade and services (particularly tourism),
provided a safety cushion against employment losses. Large
industrial enterprises (ie. those employing 25 or more workers)
held back on labour retrenchment, and were more inclined to cut
work hours than the work force in the first year of the reform.
Given the uncertainties surrounding the reform process,
enterprises may have perceived that the output decline was
temporary. Additionally, the pressure for downsizing was small,
as the incomes policy contributed to a sharp decline in product
unit labour costs. There was no catch up in labour shedding in
1992-93, with output and employment declining in parallel.
Despite the decline in employment during the Czech
transformation, it has not been matched by rising unemployment.
After peaking at 4.4% in early 1992, the unemployment rate
declined in the following 12 months and fluctuated between 2.5
and 3.5% during 1993-94. Three factors have contributed to the
low unemployment rate. Firstly many of those who lost jobs took
18

up employment in the significantly underrecorded services sector,
especially in rapidly expanding tourist related activities.
Secondly, job opportunities have been available in neighbouring
Germany and Austria. The German authorities, for example, have
estimated that some 50,000 Czechs are legally employed in
Germany, most of whom commute daily across the border into
Bavaria under a special arrangement. But the most important
factor that has kept unemployment down has been the
withdrawal of a large number of workers of pensionable age from
the labour force.
The government has also engaged in specific employment
policies with the objective of keeping unemployment down,
especially since 1992. The most important of which provide
grants and subsidies for long term jobs, short term public works
type jobs, retraining schemes and employment subsidies for high
school and college graduates. In 1992, the number of people
involved in such policy schemes exceeded 125,000.
Rebuilding the external sector
The progressive improvement in the external reserves position
(Table 9), especially since the termination of the monetary union
with Slovakia, has been impressive, and is indicative of strong
export performance, growing receipts from tourism and large
inflows of foreign capital.
The demise of the CMEA led to a major decline in exports to
its former members, requiring a reorientation of Czech exports to
the markets of Western Europe. This met with considerable
success, with the share of Czech exports to the EU jumping from
31% in 1990 to about 47% in 1994 (Table 10). Exports to
Germany alone amounted to 31% of total exports. Greater access
to EU markets in March 1992 arising from an Association
Agreement and a further trade agreement with the European Free
19

Trade Association (EFTA), were both influential in helping to
direct exports away from the former CMEA countries toward the
industrial economies of Western Europe. Exports to Western
markets continued their strong growth in 1993 and 1994.
However the Czech Republic has also been making inroads into
new markets for products adversely affected by EU restrictions,
such as iron and steel products (for example to China in 1993
which absorbed 10% of the increase in exports). These overall
gains have more than offset the steep decline in exports to
Slovakia.
An important factor behind this successful reorientation of
trade was the initial depreciation of the exchange rate at the
beginning of the reform program, which created a substantial gain
in competitiveness for Czech enterprises. Since this time
competitiveness has been steadily eroded, but relative to its pre
transition period it has still improved.
The scope for trade reorientation is much greater for the Czech
Republic in comparison to its transition neighbours, due to its
larger initial dependence on CMEA markets (Table 1). In
addition, the structure of its commodity exports is more suited to
taking advantage of its increased access to EU markets.
Compared with Hungary and Poland, the share of agricultural
products and mineral fuels (mainly coal) in Czech exports is
small. With the exception of steel and some chemical products its
access to EU markets for industrial products is largely
unrestricted, while markets for agricultural products and coal are
struggling with over capacity and strict regulations. The Czech
Republic has also benefited from new marketing links associated
with direct foreign investment, which has led to the diversification
of its exports. Initially the rapid increase in Czech exports was
concentrated on intermediate manufactured goods, but since 1993
machinery and transport equipment, which were the main
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recipients of foreign direct investment, and miscellaneous
manufactured goods have led the growth in exports.
Except for a brief period in late 1992 and early 1993, foreign
medium and long term capital inflows have grown steadily. Net
capital inflows amounted to an equivalent of about 12% of GDP
in 1994, compared with 5% of GDP in the former CSFR in 1991.
The nature of these inflows has changed significantly over the
past four years. In 1991, the first year of financial stabilisation,
capital inflows were largely in the form of official balance of
payments support from multilateral organisations and foreign
bond issues by the central bank. By 1992 as the success of
stabilisation efforts became apparent, and the start of the
privatisation process began, foreign private sector confidence in
the Czech Republic was substantial, and was reflected in a major
increase in foreign direct investment. From 1991 to 1992 net
foreign direct investment almost doubled to $1 billion. However
direct foreign investment slowed as the focus of the privatisation
program shifted from direct sales to the distribution of vouchers,
and also from weaker economic activity in Western Europe. The
slowdown has, however, been more than offset by rapidly rising
external borrowing by Czech enterprises. External borrowing by
enterprises accounted for nearly 40% of net capital inflows in
1994, while foreign direct investment and portfolio investment
each accounted for about one-fourth of the total. Since mid 1994
local governments and domestic commercial banks have also
turned to raising money in international capital markets.
Inflation reduction
After an unexpectedly large jump of about 40% in the first quarter
of 1991, inflation declined rapidly to less than 1% a month by
July and remained stable until August 1992. Price increases
accelerated in the last four months of 1992 and culminated in a
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jump of the monthly rate of inflation to 8.5% in January 1993,
following the introduction of a value added tax (VAT). After this,
inflation came down rapidly and was contained at 20.80% for the
12 month period ended December 1993 (Table 3).
The reduction of inflation was seen as being essential to the
containment of inflationary expectations, and was to be achieved
through tight financial policies. Inflation has tended to remain
fairly sticky, however, arising from a substantial number of
relative price changes that are still taking place as part of the
transformation process. Price rigidities still persist in the case of
house rents and charges by the public utilities. Full liberalisation
of energy prices is likely to involve increases of 45-50 per cent for
natural gas, 80-85 per cent for electricity and 15-100% for central
heating depending upon the sort of fuel being used.
Privatisation and restructuring
The government has adopted a strategy of rapid privatisation,
leaving the task of enterprise restructuring to their new private
owners. Enterprise restructuring has been relatively slow,
however, since the tasks involved for their new owners is massive
both in scale and coverage, with existing managers postponing
investment decisions and organisational changes. The legal
framework for enforcing financial discipline and encouraging
enterprise restructuring, was only put in place in April 1993. The
delay in introducing the bankruptcy law was prompted by the
government's desire to prevent bankruptcies from interfering with
the privatisation process itself.
Privatisation of small enterprises was completed in 1992,
whilst privatisation of large enterprises has been implemented in
two waves involving both conventional sales to domestic and
foreign investors as well as transfers of shares in enterprises to
citizens through a voucher scheme. In both waves, the voucher
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scheme accounted for about one-third of the book value of total
assets privatised. The first wave was concluded in May 1993,
and the second wave effectively came to an end at mid November
1994 with the completion of the last round of bidding in the
voucher scheme. The shares were distributed to voucher holders in
February 1995. With this an estimated 80% of assets in the
economy are now in private hands. The new owners of the
privatised enterprises as already indicated are expected to play
the main role in restructuring and in the strengthening of corporate
governance.
Hungary
Hungary entered the post-communist era in many respects in a
relatively favourable position compared with its former CMEA
partner countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Its more
favourable conditions included a less distortionary price system,
a more stable internal macroeconomic position at the outset of the
transition process, a smaller share of trade that was conducted
within the CMEA trading bloc (Table 1), a skilled workforce and
close proximity to Western markets. On the other hand, the
country was burdened by a very high level of external debt (Table
8 ).

During the period of transition developments in the country's
external accounts (Table 7) have provided the focal point for
macroeconomic developments. The past five years or so can be
divided into two broad periods. Firstly the period of external
stabilisation during 1990-92 when the current account recorded
small surpluses, access to external capital markets was re
established, and inflation rates initially declined before increasing
again. A second macroeconomic phase beginning in late 1992, but
more apparent in 1993-94, saw a deterioration in the private
savings-investment balance accompanied by high public sector
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dissaving, resulting in a marked deterioration in the current
account. In addition progress towards a major reduction in
inflation faltered (Table 3), employment fell sharply and officially
reported output contracted further in 1993 before recovering
somewhat in 1994 (Table 2).
Recent developments in Hungary's performance in terms of
output and employment, inflation and external balances and debt
are now discussed.
Output and employment performance
During the initial adjustment period the cumulative fall in official
GDP, over the period 1990-93, was about 20%, which was
broadly similar to that of the Czech Republic and Poland. For
Hungary the sharp decline followed a decade of slow growth (an
annual average growth rate of about 1.5%) despite a high
investment to GDP ratio, which had been partly financed by
external borrowing. The first strong growth in GDP occurred after
seven years in 1994 at some 2.6% (Table 2). The earlier output
decline was accompanied by a broadly similar lagged
proportional decline in employment. Official unemployment rates
increased rapidly to over 10% (Table 4), despite a sizeable part
of the reduction in employment being followed by a reduction in
the active labour force.
For the period 1990-93, the decline in output affected most
sectors and all major demand categories. At the beginning it was
particularly pronounced in industry (Table 5) and construction,
while agricultural output fell sharply in 1992-93 as a result of
severe droughts the effects of which were, further aggravated by
uncertainties and initial inefficiencies related to the transfer of
property claims in this sector. Smaller declines were recorded in
the services sector. Gross investment declined from some 26% of
GDP in 1989 to around 15% in 1992, and the external sector
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began to show a sharp deterioration in 1993. At this time a
recovery in domestic demand contributed to a strong acceleration
in imports while exports fell by some 12% in real terms, resulting
in a noticeable widening of the external gap (Table 7). In 1994 the
external balance remained largely unchanged and the recovery of
GDP growth reflected a strong expansion of domestic demand, in
particular form investment and private consumption, as
household's disposable real income increased by over 3%.
The loss of trade with other CMEA countries presented a
major disruption to the Hungarian economy, which eliminated
existing productive structures and interrupted long standing
business links that could only be replaced to a limited extent by
trade with other markets in the short run. Even though the
importance of CMEA trade disruptions may have been less in
Hungary than in several other countries, with rouble trade
accounting for about 42% of exports in 1988 (an additional 10%
was conducted in convertible currencies with the then socialist
countries), these disruptions did represent a major shock to the
domestic economy. However if this had been the only major
shock, external trade would have also recorded the sharpest
contraction in its aftermath. Yet this did not happen and the
share of exports in GDP remained fairly stable during the years
1991-92.
The Hungarian government has been slow to reduce its
dominant influence over the economy. The share of general
government expenditure in GDP increased by almost 10
percentage points in 1991-93 to over 60%. The large role of the
state contributed to a heavy tax burden with disincentives for
work and investment, and negative effects on overall production
in the economy. The increased government expenditure was partly
a result of increased, and inadequate targeting of, social
expenditures related to declining economic activity. In addition to
the level of state involvement, the widening borrowing requirement
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of the public sector (Table 6) is likely to have resulted in some
crowding out of private credit with negative effects on
investment.
The effect of uncertainty on investment may have slowed the
transformation process initially as enterprises postponed
investment activities until at least some of the uncertainties were
resolved. However in view of its political stability and sizeable
inflow of foreign direct investment (Table 13), this argument is
probably less persuasive in Hungary for the years 1990-93 than in
most other countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Other factors contributing to developments in GDP at this time
included a redistribution of income towards labour and a
resulting deterioration in enterprise profits, which had negative
repercussions on investment and on the short term growth
capacity of the economy. A sizeable rise in household saving rates
at the beginning of the transformation process in 1991-92, may
have weakened demand and output in this period. The situation
changed dramatically in 1993 when the share of household saving
in GDP fell by about 6 percentage points. There was a slow
growth of credit to enterprises during this period, a reflection of
risk assessment, which contributed to pricing many enterprises
out of the credit market. On the credit supply side the financial
weakness of the banking sector contributed to the slower credit
expansion, with most of this being absorbed by the public sector.
The recession in Western Europe, depression in other transforming
countries, a prolonged drought with large output losses in the
agricultural sector, UN sanctions against the neighbouring Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) also contributed to
GDP developments at this time.
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Inflation
Inflation rates accelerated in 1990-91, peaking in mid 1991 at
around 40%. Whilst it has declined since it has shown
considerable inertia, remaining at around 20% since early 1992.
This inflation inertia to some extent reflects the gradual removal
of subsidies which is being implemented over a number of years
and is still continuing. While this policy of gradually eliminating
subsidies may have limited the size of price increases in the short
term, it is likely that the cost of this policy is the entrenchment of
inflationary expectations over a longer period of time .
Increases in labour incomes provided a persistent cost push
factor during this period. For example during 1990-93 real wages
fell by only about 2%, and the decrease was more than recovered
by the 3.5% rise in real wages in 1994.
The conduct of monetary policy also contributed to persistent
inflation. Without well explained and well understood monetary
targets, including that for the exchange rate, the economy lacked a
clearly visible nominal anchor. Exchange rates were adjusted
intermittently in an ad hoc fashion against a basket of currencies,
with considerable uncertainty surrounding each devaluation and
the exchange rate path. Domestic monetary conditions also
lacked at times the necessary firmness and stability for reducing
inflation. This was particularly apparent in 1992 and early 1993,
when an easing of monetary conditions was accompanied by a
sizeable sharp decline in market rates of interest.
The inability of monetary policy to address the inflation
problem more decisively reflected to some extent insufficient
support from other policy instruments, most notably that of fiscal
policy. Public sector dissaving also contributed to the large
external current account gap that increasingly required the
attention of monetary policy instruments, at times at the expense
of a lower inflation rate. The effectiveness of monetary policy was
further hindered by the ease of availability of government
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guaranteed and subsidised credits. This effectively protected a
considerable segment of the market from the transmission
mechanism of indirect monetary policy instruments through
interest rates. These forms of credit amounted to about two thirds
of the increase in credit to enterprises in 1994.
The external balance and foreign debt
Early on in the transition process the external accounts performed
much better than anticipated. In terms of the saving-investment
balance, this reflected a strong improvement in household saving
in 1991-92 and weak investment demand. Hungary was also
initially successful at containing imports even as trade was
liberalised. Exports were directed towards the West, and the
share of industrial countries in total exports increased from 40%
in 1989 to almost 70% in 1992. By 1994 about 52% of total
exports went to the EU with Germany accounting for 28% of total
exports (Table 10).
The current account was in surplus over the period 1990-92
and the net debt level decreased by $800 million to about 43% of
GDP. Interestingly, Hungary attracted larger inflows of foreign
direct investment than any other country in Central and Eastern
Europe, averaging over $1 billion in this period (Table 13). In
addition, the renewed access to international capital markets
after 1990 enabled the central bank to borrow from abroad and
increase its foreign exchange reserves (Table 9).
In 1993 and 1994, however, the current account deteriorated
noticeably, being $3.5 and $3.9 billion respectively (each close to
10% of GDP), with a sharp decline in exports but continued
strong growth in imports. This development was due to a number
of developments including a loss of cost competitiveness arising
from comparatively large increases in labour costs during 199092, which left labour costs considerably above those in other
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transition economies. There was also a strong growth in domestic
demand which stimulated imports but a recession in Western
Europe which depressed exports. In addition the large dissavings
of the state, with a fiscal deficit of 6.7% and 6% of GDP
respectively in 1993 and 1994 (Table 6), weakened the
macroeconomic saving-investment balance. On the supply side a
drought related reduction in agricultural exports, repercussions
from the 1992 bankruptcy law and the effects of UN sanctions on
a neighbouring country also played a role in widening the external
deficits.
The deterioration of the current account in 1993 and 1994 was
offset by non debt and debt creating capital inflows. Foreign
direct investment was particularly strong in 1993, exceeding $2
billion, assisted by the partial privatisation of the
telecommunication sector. In international capital markets
enterprise and, especially, official borrowing increased strongly
during this period, with the latter concentrated in the bond
market. This was in part used to increase the foreign exchange
reserves of the central bank, which increased to $6.8 billion at the
end of 1993, with a further small increase to $6.9 billion in 1994.
The deterioration of the current account resulted in a further
increase in foreign debt. Gross external debt increased to $27.7
billion (69.5% of GDP) (Table 8) and the debt service ratio4
increased precariously to 60.8% in 1994. Such developments
indicated an urgent need to reduce the size of the current account
deficit, and to bring about changes which would reduce the
country's external indebtedness. Policy makers in Hungary have
recently initiated measures to tackle this important issue.

4

Debt service payments as a per cent of exports of goods and non factor
services.
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Poland
Poland has received significant attention because of the recovery
of growth of the economy since 1992, the first of the Central and
Eastern European transition economies to achieve such an
outcome. This followed a period in 1990 and 1991 which saw a
collapse of economic activity Table 2), after the introduction of a
comprehensive program for economic transformation. Since
Poland embarked on this program earlier than the other countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, the recovery of output and
Poland's experiences contain valuable lessons for other countries
pursuing the road to a market economy.
Economic performance in 1990, the year in which the reform
program was introduced, was mixed. Inflation reached the
hyperinflationary level of 585% (Table 3), reflecting in part the
initial choice of a fixed exchange rate at 9,500 zlotys to the US
dollar. The general government fiscal balance recorded a surplus
equivalent to 3.2% of GDP (Table 6) which was in part due to a
one off increase in revenues arising from the taxation on nominal
inventory valuation adjustments, taxation that contributed to the
decapitalisation of the state enterprise sector. An incomes policy
was set in place with a projected level of inflation that in the
event turned out to be an underestimate, resulting in real wages
falling sharply. This and the fiscal outcome resulted in a decline in
domestic demand in 1990, which contributed to the sizeable
surplus on current account (Table 7). These activity dampening
developments contributed to the sharp decline in GDP growth in
this year by some 11.6%.
It was anticipated that economic activity in 1991 would
recover, but once again GDP declined by a further 7%. The most
important factor contributing to this further decline was the
collapse in trade amongst the CMEA partner countries, and the
resulting deterioration in the terms of trade. There was also
evidence of slow adjustment to the new economic realities with
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real wages increasing by 3%, reflecting in part the persistence of
inappropriate incentive structures in the state enterprise sector. In
addition a combination of reluctance on the part of enterprises to
shed labour in the face of real wage increases and declining
demand, contributed to a steep decline in enterprise profits. This
in turn contributed to a decline in revenue to the government at a
time when there was intense pressure to expand the social
expenditure program. This was further compounded by the
postponement of a value added tax to replace the turnover tax in
this year, and the poor targeting of social expenditure programs.
Overall consumption gained at the expense of investment in
1991, with an associated deterioration in Poland's current
account balance, foreign exchange reserves (Table 9) and
noticeable appreciation of the real exchange rate. These
developments did not result in an acceleration of inflation.
Although it still remained high, at 70%, this was significantly less
than its rate in 1990.
The outlook as Poland entered 1992 was for a prolonged
period of pronounced adjustment, and it was hoped that output
in that year would fall no further. However the economy
experienced a sharp turnaround in the early part of the year, with
industrial production, in particular, showing a major recovery
rising by 4.2% in 1992 (Table 5) after a cumulative decline of 42%
during 1989-91. The recovery was broad based reflecting mainly
favourable domestic supply factors, assisted, in part, by
increased access to EU markets and gains in competitiveness
from a further currency devaluation in February. The private
sector played a key role in the recovery, with industrial
production in the private sector increasing by 32% while in the
state sector it declined by 5%. As a result the share of industrial
output in private hands increased from a fourth in 1991 to almost
a third in 1992. Industrial productivity was also considerably
enhanced by the substantial shedding of employment. In addition
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within the state sector there was increasing evidence that
enterprises were adjusting to the realities of hard budget
constraints, implying a general strengthening of corporate
governance. GDP increased by some 2.6% in this year.
Despite attempts to reduce it, and the buoyancy of the
economy, the fiscal balance deteriorated further in 1992, largely
reflecting the persistence of underlying structural problems in the
budget and difficulties in the implementing structural reforms on
both the revenue and expenditure side. The introduction of a
comprehensive tax on personal incomes in January 1992 was a
notable exception. The fiscal deficit for the year was equivalent to
6.7% of GDP.
Whilst the trade balance improved, primarily due to a larger
decline in merchandise imports relative to exports, the current
account deteriorated further (to 3.7% of GDP), largely due to a
sizeable increase in the deficit on net income flows.
Official projections for 1993 included a rise of 2% in real GDP.
However the actual recovery in economic activity was much
stronger, especially in the first half of the year. For example
industrial production in mid 1993 was 8.5% higher in comparison
to the equivalent period in the previous year, with employment in
this sector stabilising. However the increase in demand in 1993
outstripped that of supply, and the savings-investment balance
deteriorated by some 4 percentage points of GDP. Progress in
terms of consumer price inflation continued with inflation falling
to 35% for the year.
The fiscal deficit for the year was equivalent to 2.9% of GDP,
significantly less than the anticipated deficit of 5% of GDP. The
improved result reflected buoyant revenues from the stronger than
expected recovery of economic activity, and the successful
introduction of a VAT to replace the system of turnover taxes.
However the sizeable deterioration of the trade balance and the
current account was of considerable concern, largely arising from
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a significant increase in imports with the further recovery of
economic activity. Concerns about the deteriorating trade
performance and Poland's international competitiveness,
influenced the decision to devalue the zloty by a further 7.4%
against a basket of currencies in August 1993. At the same time it
was announced that the rate of crawl would be reduced from
1.8% per month to 1.6% per month. Developments towards the
end of 1993 and early 1994 indicated a reversal of the
deterioration of the trade balance and a strengthened
international reserve position, suggesting that the strong domestic
excess demand pressures had significantly been reduced.
Inflation, however, was still proving to be stubbornly high.
The 1990 transformation was introduced against a background
of large and growing macroeconomic imbalances. Since this time
the Polish economy has made substantial overall progress on its
transition path to a market economy. Major success has been
achieved in reducing inflation from the hyperinflationary levels in
1989 and 1990, to 32% a year by 1994 and this is projected to
fall further in the near future. Reflecting this development,
confidence in the zloty is being restored and the country has
begun to remonetise. The impact of comprehensive liberalisation
has been to reduce queues apparent during the 1980s, and the
range and quality of goods available has dramatically improved.
The economy has also acquired a growing and dynamic private
sector, accounting for some 50% of total output. In addition the
financial performance of many state enterprises has greatly
improved in advance of their privatisation. The liberalisation of
Poland's trade regime has also resulted in an outward oriented
economy that is looking to exports for growth. Finally, economic
activity has been expanding in Poland over the past 4 years,
making it the most rapidly growing transition economy in Central
and Eastern Europe.
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PROSPECTS FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE EU
Membership of the EU by the three economies under study, as
well as that of Slovakia and Slovenia5, will be essentially a
political rather than economic decision. Certainly few economic
commentators in Western Europe would be serious enough to
extend EU membership to these Central Europe countries at
present on purely economic grounds. EU membership requires the
fulfilment of three conditions:
i.

applicants must be European,

ii.

applicants must be market oriented, and

iii.

applicants must be democratic.

All of these conditions have now largely been satisfied by the
three economies under review. From the perspective of these
countries priority must be given over the next few years to
obtaining full membership of the EU, with any watering down of
this likely to be unacceptable. Integration with Western Europe
offers the prospect to them of a better way of life and a higher
standard of living. Membership of the EU would provide them
with the basis to achieve the kind of society which they wish to
become. From the EU's perspective the costs and benefits of such
membership, both economic and political, need careful scrutiny.
Some of the key issues relating to this are now discussed.
A number of problems are likely to arise from the possible
membership of the Central European economies, and these
include:

5 These fellow Central European economies have also applied to join the EU.
Although much smaller size than the three economies reviewed in this paper,
populations of 5.4 and 2.0 million respectively, they have a similar GDP per
capita, and were projected by the IMF to achieve real growth rates of GDP
between 4-5% over the period 1994 to 1996.
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The economic imbalance between the EU and the Central
European economies
The countries of Central Europe constitute a market of some 70
million people. The demand for high quality produce from the
west is very strong and would appear, therefore, to be an inviting
new market for the west. However, Central Europe in comparison
with Western Europe is still poor (Table 11), with living
standards being approximately one-third of that of the EU
average6. Central Europe itself admits that EU membership will
have adverse consequences for some of its own industries, unable
to compete with the west, but sees an expanded market as
offsetting these adverse effects bringing benefits to domestic
producers.
Common Agricultural Policy
One major problem standing in the way of Central European
membership is the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This
presently accounts for about half of the EU's budget. Unless this
is radically overhauled and farmers exposed to world prices and
markets, the cost of integrating Central Europe will be equivalent
to one-third of existing farm spending according to calculations
done by the EU in Brussels. Alternatively the larger farming states
of Central Europe, particularly Poland, might have to be content
with some watered down form of membership that keeps them
out of the CAP. This is of concern to the Central Europeans who
may find such "second class" membership unacceptable.
The contribution of agriculture in the EU and Central Europe is
very lopsided. The exception to this is the Czech Republic which

6 The poorest country to join the EU to date has been that of Portugal, which
had a standard of living approximately half of the then average of EU
members.
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is much closer to EU averages (Table 12). In the EU only one
person in 20 makes a living from the land, whilst in Poland
(accounting for almost 60% of the population of Central Europe)
one person in three lives in the countryside and mostly lives off it
too. In Hungary nearly a third of the population live in the
countryside, although only a tenth are formally employed in
agriculture. Central Europe is very rural, with some 58% of its
land area given over to farming compared with 43% in the EU.
The sector accounts for 5.5% of Central Europe's regional GDP
which is over twice its average share in the EU. Farming is
particularly important in Poland where, unlike say Hungarian
farmers who were collectivised, Polish peasants continue to
cultivate small plots in the way that they always have. Polish
farms are very small with an average size of 7 hectares, whilst the
EU average is 16.
Like Hungary, Poland is a large exporter of food. But, unlike
Hungary, it has become a net food importer since its transition to
a market economy. One reason for this is that its food industry
does not provide the quality Poles now expect. The small farms in
Poland therefore cannot compete, and could only survive in the
EU with an unacceptably high level of financial support. Major
restructuring of the Polish economy would therefore be required.
The problem for Poland would be compounded by the fact that
its cities already have high levels of unemployment, higher than in
most of Central Europe, and could not easily absorb a massive
influx of people from the land. The EU in a recent review of the
former eastern bloc's farm prospects, concluded that any future
financial support should go into rural infrastructure,
modernisation and putting together smallholdings to make viable
farms. Certainly not into maintaining prices and incomes.
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Disharmony and instability
Instead of co-operating with each other, the countries of Central
Europe compete and squabble amongst themselves. In addition
there is alway the question of political and economic instability.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a key measure of the perceived
stability of an economy. The three Central European economies
focused upon in this paper are short of cash and hence the role of
FDI will be crucial to their development. However since 1990 the
picture is quite variable (Table 13). Poland and the Czech
Republic, for example, have proved to be very disappointing in
this regard. The stable and market minded Czech Republic might
have been expected to have been very attractive to foreign
investors. Yet total foreign investment since 1990, at under $4
billion, has been disappointing. This could be due to the fact that
the government still controls much of basic industry. The low
unemployment rate of below 5% suggests also that it has failed so
far to undertake essential industrial restructuring. Poland
similarly has performed disappointingly in this regard, and one
reason suggested by German investors, the major single source of
FDI to these countries, is the instability caused by the numerous
changes of government. Since 1990 they have had a different
government every year. Hungary shifted relatively easily to
western ways in the 1990s, and has attracted nearly half the $18
billion of FDI in Central Europe since 1989, although the pace of
this is slowing down. However Hungary's recent intense financial
plight (high budget deficits and perilously high foreign debt) has
resulted in the imposition of a tight austerity program, which
threatens economic growth and FDI. Membership of the EU could
ease such concerns about instability which appear to exist,
thereby encouraging further FDI for these three countries.
After the deliberations of the present 15 EU members as to
their own future in Spring 1996, it would then be possible for
serious negotiations to take place over the membership of the
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Central European economies. A number of encouraging
developments have recently taken place which would improve
their prospects.
• The economic performance of the three economies under
review has been improving, with obvious problems still
apparent. Poland's economy is the fastest growing in Europe,
with 5% real growth of GDP anticipated for 1995 and 1996.
Well above that in the EU itself. Already around 60% of GNP
comes from the private sector. Poland has reently been
compared with the Asian tiger countries by the German
Deutsche Bank. Inflation is coming down but still remains too
high, whilst unemployment at around 12% is the same as in
France and much lower than in Spain. Problems with
agriculture, in particular, keeps the country's standard of
living down. The Czech Republic is now also experiencing
steady growth of real GDP comparable with that in the EU,
inflation is still well above the average in the EU but is still
better than some members such as Greece, but unemployment
is much below that of the EU. Hungary has been slow to
recover from the initial sharp drop in output arising from the
economic reforms, and inflation has remained stubbornly high
as with unemployment. Its major difficulties remain in terms
of the fiscal deficit, the current account deficit and its very
high, per capita, foreign debt.
• The three countries have reoriented their trade towards the
EU very successfully (Table 10) and would wish to expand
this further, as well as attracting further FDI from EU
members. Germany, in particular, has become a very
important market for their exports, and is a major source of
capital imports in particular. In the space of five years, well
over half the region's trade is now conducted with Western
Europe with invariably Germany as the leading partner.
Germany is also the major source of FDI for the Central
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•

•

European economies after the US and Italy, and, under the
leadership of Chancellor Kohl, is also a major sponsor of
Central European membership of the EU.
The countries of Central Europe have a number of advantages
including a cheap and well educated labour force, and a
dynamism which has enabled them to redirect their trade so
effectively to the west.
So far in Central Europe this labour force has remained where
it is, however further instability could create a wave of
migration which would be difficult to control and Germany,
in particular, would face the brunt of it. Hence a major, and
influential, sponsor of Central European membership of the
EU has been Germany. The desire to see stability and rising
living standards in the countries on its eastern borders, is
seen as being very important to them. Chancellor Kohl has
made little secret of his desire to see membership of the EU
by the Central European countries by the end of the decade.
This time period, at the very least, will be required to enable
these countries to achieve a level of development compatible
with membership of the EU.

SUMMARY/CONCLUSIONS
This paper has conducted a review of the recent economic reforms
and post reform macroeconomic performance of three Central
European economies — Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
The reforms implemented clearly had a traumatic initial impact
upon these countries, however there are positive indications that
these economies are now in the recovery phase. The extent of this
varies across the three countries. Poland's recent economic growth
has been very strong and their is the anticipation that the Czech
Republic is about to achieve the same, although Hungary's
performance is still very weak. Major restructuring will still be
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required, particularly in the Czech Republic and Hungary,
although significant progress in a number of areas has already
been achieved. The remarkable reorietation of their trade towards
the EU since the reforms and the continuing need for FDI to
facilitate the restructuring process, suggests that these countries
must look west. The development of their market oriented
economies, desire for a higher standard of living and quality
western goods by the populace, as well as desire for security and
political independence, all indicate that their future lies with
Western Europe and membership of the EU in particular.
These countries have a major sponsor for EU membership in
the very influential form of Germany, by the year 2000 according
to Chancellor Kohl, which would see the membership of these
countries as achieving a number of their political and security
goals. However it seems apparent that the EU which these
countries wish to join is not necessarily that envisaged by the
German authorities. The latter envisages a united economic and
political Europe, including that of a European parliament, central
bank and single currency, however the Central Europeans have a
vision which is closer to that of the UK's, where Europe would be
made up of independent nation states united mainly for economic
rather than political ends. This would add another interesting
dimension to the future evolution of the EU, should these
countries achieve membership by the end of the century.
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Table 2 Real GDP Growth (%)

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993*
1994*
1995**
1996**

Czech
Republic***

Hungary

Poland

4.50
-0.40
-15.90
-8.50
-0.90
2.60
3.80
4.90

0.70
-3.50
-11.90
-4.30
-2.30
2.60
0.20
1.50

0.20
-11.60
-7.00
2.60
3.80
6.00
5.00
5.00

EU
3.50
3.00
1.10
1.00
-0.40
2.80
3.20
3.10

* Estimates
** Projected
*** Until 1992 The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (SCFR)
Source: IMF, World Outlook, May 1995.

Table 3 Consumer Price Inflation (%)

Republic*
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

1.40
10.80
59.00
11.00
20.80
10.00
8.00
7.00

H™ « a,y
16.90
29.00
34.20
23.00
22.50
18.80
28.00
17.00

Poland
251.10
585.80
70.30
43.00
35.30
32.20
25.00
12.00

* Until 1992 The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR)
Source: IMF, World Outlook, May 1995.
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EU
4.70
5.40
5.30
4.50
3.80
3.10
3.10
2.80

Table 4 Unemployment (% of Labour Force)
Czech
Republic
____

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Hungary

__

0.60
1.40
7.50
12.30
12.50
10.50

0.70
4.10
2.60
3.50
3.20

EU

Poland

8.50
7.90
8.50
9.80
11.00
11.60

5.00
10.00
14.00
16.50
16.00

Source: IMF and EIU

Table 5 Industrial Production (1990=100)

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Republic

HuIW

103.10
100.00
78.40
72.20
68.40
70.00*

109.30
100.00
78.20
70.60
73.30
77.50**

* Preliminary
** Figure for the forth quarter
*** Figure for the third quarter
Source: IMF and Author's Calculations
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Poland
134.10
100.00
84.00
87.30
92.70***
na

Table 6 Fiscal Balances (% of GDP)
Czech
Republic
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994*
1995**

-2.70
0.10
-1.90
-3.60
0.80
0.80
-0.10

Hungary

Poland

-1.70
0.50
-2.10
-5.50
-6.70
-6.00
-6.50

-7.30
3.20
-6.50
-6.70
-2.90
-3.00
-3.30

EU***
-2.40
-3.60
-4.40
-5.10
-6.40
-5.80
-4.80

* Estimates
** Forecasts
*** General Government Fiscal Balance
Source: IMF

Table 7 Current Account ($ Billion, % of GDP)

-0.60 -1.90
0.30 1.20
0.40 0.90
0.30 0.90
-3.50 -9.60
-3.90 -9.50

* Estimate
Source: IMF
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-1.40
3.10
-2.10
-3.10
-5.80

-1.70
5.00
-2.70
-3.70
-6.80

na

na

EU
$ Billion, US

% of GDP

-0.60 -1.90
1.70 7.00
-0.10 -0.40
0.10 0.30
0.10 0.30

Poland
$ Billion, US

__

% of GDP

_

Hungary
$ Billion, US

% of GDP

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994*

$ Billion, US

Czech Republic

-11.40
-35.30
-81.90
-74.70
10.90
28.50

Table 8 Gross External Debt ($ Billion, % of GDP)
Czech Republic
to

Poland

CD

tn
D
c0

D

S
.2

D
U

«

o

*—
<

1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

Hungary

__

__

5.90
6.70
6.90
8.50
10.70

18.70
27.60
24.60
27.20
29.70

oc'
£

20.40
21.30
22.80
21.90
24.50
27.70

B
t»

a.
D
a
o
c£

43.10
49.40
52.80
48.50

52.40
79.30
67.70
57.50

na
na

na
na

C-,
D
O
o
a?
73.20
64.60
73.30
63.40
64.40
69.50

Source: IMF

Table 9 Gross Reserves ($US Billion)
Czech
Republic*
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994

2.20
1.10
3.20
1.10
3.80
6.20

Hungary

Poland

1.30
1.10
3.90
4.40
6.80
6.9**

2.30
4.50
3.60
4.10
4.10
5.80

* 1989-92 The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
** Third quarter figure only
Source: IMF , International Financial Statistics (Various)
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Source: IMF

Table 10 Trade with the West. Trade figures as % of total, 1994
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Table 11 Living Standards

Germany
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Hungary
Poland

GDP* per
head 1993, $

Car Ownership
1995, % of
households

20,980
7,700
6,450
6,260
5,010

72t
60
48
51
47

* At PPP exchange rates + 1993
Sources: World Bank; ANR: German Federal Statistics Office
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Table 12 Agricultural Production/Employment
Agricultural Production
as % of total GDP, 1993
3

2

4

6

8

Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Czech Republic
EU-15

Agricultural Employment
as % of total employment, 1993

0

5

10

Hungary
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Czech Republic
EU-15

Source: European Commission
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15

20

25

Table 13 Foreign Direct Investment, $bn, 1990-1995*
0

2

4

6

8

10

»— -------• -----------a - ----------• — ---------a ----------- •

Hungary
Poland
Czech Republic
Slovenia
Slovakia

* To October
Source: National Statistics
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